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7/11/63
Stevenson paper
read by him at
Dec 10 Epcom meeting

Advantages and Disadvantages of Winding Up Cuban Issue in Security Council

I. In our telegram of Friday we recommended favorable consideration of the latest Soviet approach to a final agreement on the Cuban crisis, with appropriate modifications to assure that it meets our interests. These modifications included:

a. The maintenance in the U.S. declaration of the point that ~~the~~ verification and safeguards had not been capable of fulfillment, the qualifications on the no invasion assurances, and the reference to existing treaties,

b. Deletion of the paragraph on negotiations to "normalize" the situation in Cuba and broadening of the reference to offensive weapons in the Soviet declaration,

c. Replacement of a Security Council resolution making the declaration a "decision" of the Security Council ~~into~~ a consensus statement expressing an "attitude" of the Security Council and

d. Assuring that the Council's consensus took equal cognizance of the agreed and unagreed declarations (i.e. therefore including cognizance of our statement on over-flights) rather than being confined to the "agreed" declarations.

II. Advantages of Such a Procedure.

1. A Security Council session which embraced the above program would prejudice the hands of S.C. members with respect to over-flights. (Declarations made ~~with~~ the Council by the U.S. and the USSR and filed with the Secretary General would somewhat increase the chances for the over-flight problem being brought into the S.C. later by Cuba; declarations made and not filed with the Council would increase the risk somewhat further.) Even though some Council members would explicitly divorce themselves from approval of over-flights, the fact that a consensus was adopted by the Council after our statement, and that the consensus took note of that statement, would make it more difficult (although, of course, not impossible) for the issue subsequently to be raised. The Council, in other words would have been notified of our intention and although some members disagreed would have refrained from doing anything about it.

2. A final round in the Security Council has the inherent advantage of marking for the world a fairly clear end to the current crisis, with possible future benefits in our broader relations with the USSR.

3. Going

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By MEO NARS, Date 5-28-76

3. Going back to the USSR with proposals on these lines would, if rejected, improve our political posture in the face of possible total ending of the negotiations. It would certainly be ^{wise} for us to say that we had no further proposals to make and to revert to the idea of unilateral declarations.'

III. Disadvantages.

1. Several S.C. members would undoubtedly feel compelled to express opposition to over-flights, e.g. USSR, Rumania, UAR and Ghana. It is uncertain how many would specifically be willing to say anything endorsing ~~it~~ them.
2. Cuba undoubtedly would make a very strong statement on this point.
3. The separation of agreed and disagreed points into separate declarations might only serve to highlight the points of disagreement.

IV. Tactical Approach to Achieve a Solution on these Lines.

1. We would give USSR our two declarations and ^a consensus statement along the lines sent to the Department and tell them the changes we want in their declaration. We would ask to see their "unagreed" declaration.
2. We would ask to see the Cuban statement for the Council also, in order to assure that it would not be too "odious" (or make comments on ^{one} we now have.)
3. Both the U.S. and USSR would seek to ^{Qn} assure that statements by other S.C. members stay within the same political framework, i.e. that they were not "odious" either.
4. The consensus statement agreed to by the U.S. and USSR would be approved by other Council members and the S.C. President before the Council convened.

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